The Poison Pill Warrant - Apothecary and Antidote: Moran v. Household International, Inc. by Ellin, David Ronald
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 3 Spring 1987 Article 7 
The Poison Pill Warrant - Apothecary and Antidote: Moran v. 
Household International, Inc. 
David Ronald Ellin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
David R. Ellin, The Poison Pill Warrant - Apothecary and Antidote: Moran v. Household International, Inc., 
36 DePaul L. Rev. 413 (1987) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol36/iss3/7 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
THE POISON PILL WARRANT-APOTHECARY
AND ANTIDOTE:
MORAN v. HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL, INC.
INTRODUCTION
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,' the Delaware Supreme
Court sounded the bugle to end yet another battle in the world of corporate
acquisition wars. The issue in this case was the validity of a "poison pill '"2
anti-takeover device implemented by the board of directors of Household
International to stave off hostile takeover plans that may have been secretly
brewing in the uneasy and volatile environment surrounding the financial
services industry.3 The Household court, in a case of first impression,
upheld the board's implementation of the poison pill 4 as a legitimate
exercise of business judgment,' even though no corporate "raider ' 6 had
yet attempted a takeover.
7
1. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
2. The Delaware Supreme Court, unlike the Delaware Chancery Court, did not call the
anti-takeover device implemented by Household the "poison pill" but rather the "Plan" or
"Rights Plan." 500 A.2d at 1348.
3. The Household record showed that "bust up" takeovers in the financial services industry
were pervasive at the time. 500 A.2d at 1349. A "bust up" takeover refers to a situation in
which a corporate raider, after acquiring a target, sells off assets of the target in order to
finance the takeover. Id. at 1349 n.4.
4. The Household decision was not the first to consider the poison pill. Similar issues
were addressed in Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984)
(upholding springing warrants permitting purchase of raider's stock at favorable prices); Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. Lenox, Inc., No. 83-2116 (D.N.J. June 20, 1983) (temporary
restraining order involving poison pill tactics denied); National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell
Co., No. 7278 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983) (preliminary injunction involving poison pill denied).
A myriad of other anti-takeover devices has been upheld by Delaware courts. See, e.g.,
Siebert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 5631 (Del. Ch. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 414 A.2d
882 (Del. 1980) (upholding shark repellent anti-takeover device); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer
Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967) (target board's issuance of stock to friendly persons
to deter take over upheld). Contra Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 7899 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 12, 1985) (use of greenmail defense upheld); Telvest, Inc., v. Olson, Civ. No. 5798 (Del.
Ch.) (holding shark repellent device invalid because a few shareholders had total control over
success of tender offers), appeal denied, 405 A.2d 132 (Del. 1979); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del.
Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (repurchase of stock from raider upheld).
5. 500 A.2d at 1357.
6. "Raider" is a term used to refer to a person or corporation seeking to force a merger
or consolidation against the wishes of the target corporation. See 111 CONG. REC. 28,257 (1965)
(remarks of Sen. Williams).
7. 500 A.2d at 1349.
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The most significant aspect of the Household decision is that the Del-
aware Supreme Court authorized the implementation of a corporate de-
fensive device to preempt the possibility of a takeover. Another significant
aspect of the Household decision is the court's affirmation that poison
pills are to join rank with a myriad of other anti-takeover devices' judged
according to the business judgment rule. 9 Moreover, the decision is not
without a practical side. Household and the cases cited therein may be
used to set up guidelines for exercising prudent business judgment when
adopting a poison pill defense. Thus, Household is an apothecary of sorts,
prescribing the "medicine" of prudent business judgment.
8. A partial list of anti-takeover devices includes:
The "Pac-Man" Defense: The target corporation defends against a hostile takeover by
tendering for the raider's stock. The target's counter offer changes the terms of the combination
upon merger, ideally making the targei corporation dominant. By making a counter offer, the
target implicitly acknowledges the desirability of a merger. Thus, the device is not a true anti-
takeover device. See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 633 (D.
Md. 1982) (Pac-Man defense upheld).
The "Crown Jewel" Defense: This defense gives a friendly party the option to purchase a
target corporation's most valuable asset. Thus, raiders are discouraged from acquiring the target
because its value will severely diminish when the option is exercised. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp.
v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (crown jewel defense upheld), aff'd mem.,
Nos. 82-1305 and 82-1307 (7th Cir. 1982). But see Mobile Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., 669
F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (lock-up device similar to crown jewel invalidated as manipulative).
The "Golden Parachute" Defense: Special employment contracts are given to key executives
providing large severance bonuses and acceleration of benefits should they be forced to bailout
of a hostile takeover. Thus, a raider is discouraged from acquiring a target because the target's
assets will pay for the severance bonuses. See, e.g., Morrison, Those Executive Bailout Deals,
FORTUNE, Dec. 3, 1982, at 82, 84 (Bendix Corp. granted its CEO a $4 million golden parachute).
The "Greenmail" Defense: The target corporation repurchases stock acquired by a raider at
an inflated price as an incentive to stop a takeover attempt. See infra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text. See generally Gruenbaum, Federal Regulation of Defensive Tactics, 8 CORP.
L. REv. 84 (1985).
The "Shark Repellent" Defense: Corporate charter or by-laws provide that an extremely
high percentage of shareholders must agree to a takeover before it may be consummated.
However, a board may independently approve the takeover before the raider has acquired a
certain percentage of shares. See generally Hockman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter
and By-Laws Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537 (1979) (discussing shark repellent defense).
9. 500 A.2d at 1350. The business judgment rule has been applied to a vast array of anti-
takeover devices outside of Delaware state courts. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith
Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) (poison pill defense); Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln
Savings and Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984) (shark repellent defense); Crouse-Hinds Co.
v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1980) (sale of stock to white knight);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 383 (2d Cir. 1980) (sale to white knight); Enterra
Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (greenmail agreement); Buffalo Forge
Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 717 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir.)
(white knight defense), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F.
Supp. 933 (N.D. Il. 1982) (crown jewel defense), aff'd, No. 82-1305 (7th Cir. 1982); Bendix
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 633-34 (D. Md. 1982) (Pac-Man defense).
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The purpose of this Note is to use the Household decision to suggest
practical guidelines for attorneys and corporate directors who adopt the
poison pill defense. Use of these guidelines may help win court approval,
at least Delaware court approval, of a board's decision to implement the
poison pill. But once a poison pill has been implemented, what can a
corporate raider do to counteract the pill? Antidotes to the poison pill
will also be discussed. Secondly, this Note examines the many policy
considerations for and against the use of preemptive defenses by corpo-
rations targeted for takeover. As this Note suggests, one's views on the
desirability of preemptive defenses are largely determined by one's outlook
on how preemptive defenses affect shareholder, corporate, and economic
interests.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Poison Pill
The most recent and highly publicized defense mechanism in the arsenal
of corporate anti-takeover devices is the poison pill.' 0 Poison pills are
warrants" to purchase stock which are distributed to shareholders as a
dividend on the occurrence of some predetermined event, such as a tender
offer or an acquisition of shares by a raider. 2 Each warrant, which is a
certificate entitling the owner to buy a specified amount of stock at a
specified time for a specified price, 3 initially entitles the warrant holder
to purchase shares, or fractional shares, of preferred stock at a premium
price. When the warrants are first issued, they are not likely to be exercised
because the warrant holder can purchase identical shares in the market at
a price far below the price authorized by the warrant. 14 The warrants,
10. See supra note 2.
11. Two types of poison pills have gained popularity as defensive tactics: the warrant
dividend plan, used by Household, and the convertible preferred stock plan. The warrant
dividend plan gives a dividend to shareholders in the form of a warrant to buy target common
stock. The warrants are issued when a tender offer is made or when a certain percentage of
stock is acquired by a raider. The convertible preferred plan gives a stock dividend in the form
of convertible preferred stock which is convertible into common stock when a raider acquires
a certain percentage of shares. See Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-
Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1964, 1964-65 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Protecting Shareholders]. The convertible preferred poison pill is not the
focus of this Note so its discussion will be limited.
12. The occurrence of the event and the subsequent issuance of warrants is known as the
"trigger." 500 A.2d at 1348.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (5th ed. 1979).
14. For example, the Household warrant could be exercised to purchase 1/100 share of
preferred stock at $100, making the price of one share $10,000. 500 A.2d at 1349. At the time,
Household's common stock was selling between $30 and $33. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch. 1985).
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however, will be exercised by the warrant holder when a merger or con-
solidation with a target corporation is forced by the raider 5 because the
warrant holder can purchase shares of the continuing corporation at a
fraction of their market value.' 6 The intended effect 7 of the poison pill
is to render the cost of a takeover prohibitive by inflating the value of
the target corporation's stock and, upon merger, cause a dilution in value
and control of the continuing corporation's stock. In other words, the
poison pill forces the raider, upon a merger, to foot the enormous bill
created when the warrants are exercised to purchase the continuing raider
corporation's stock at a greatly reduced price. Thus, raiders facing the
poison pill must think twice about whether they can afford their hostile
tactics.
The idea of rendering a hostile takeover cost prohibitive is not a new
one.' A predecessor to the poison pill, now a part of many corporate
charters, is the fair price provision.' 9 This provision requires a raider,
seeking to force a merger or consolidation following a tender offer, to
pay the same amount, or in many instances a premium, for shares acquired
after the merger.
The fair price provision and the poison pill are both extremely effective
in discouraging popular two-tier tender offers. 20 In the two-tier scenario,
a raider forces a merger, following a partial tender offer, and then buys
out nontendering shareholders at a price below that paid to tendering
shareholders. Two-tier tender offers are designed to stampede shareholders
into tendering at the first tier, even if the offering price is unfair, out of
fear that they will receive very little at the second tier. 2' Fair price
15. A raider frequently acquires a target through a cash tender offer. See Austin, Tender
Offer Update: 1983, 18 MERGERS & AcQuisrrIoNs 57 (1983). Cash tender offers composed 89%
of the total number of tender offers made in 1982. Id.
16. The ability to purchase shares in the continuing corporation at a fraction of their
market value is often called a "flip over" provision. See Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection
Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and
Flip Over Provisions Under Delaware Law, I 1 Sac. REG. L.J. 291, 303 (1984).
17. Although a poison pill may deter a raider, it also imposes costs upon the target. The
warrants may create a large overhang of stock that may affect the market price of the target's
common stock as well as inhibit common stock financing. Moreover, the pill deters friendly
takeovers as well as hostile ones unless the pill has a provision, as in Household, to render the
pill harmless by recalling the warrants. See Comment, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A
Proposal for Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 388 n.52 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Proposal
for Reform].
18. The crown jewel, golden parachute, and fair price provision defenses all render a
takeover cost prohibitive. For a discussion of these devices, see supra note 8.
19. For an in depth discussion of fair price provisions, see generally Finkelstein, supra note
16 (purpose of fair price provisions is to provide equivalent consideration to all shareholders).
20. See Note, Protecting Shareholders, supra note 11 at 1966-68.
21. For a discussion of the coercive nature of a two-tier tender offer, see Brudney &
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV. 297, 337
[Vol. 36:413
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provisions and poison pills discourage two-tier tender offers because they
ensure that shareholders will receive an extremely favorable price for their
shares even if they decide to sell them to the raider at the second tier.
Thus, a prospective raider seeking an inexpensive acquisition will have to
look elsewhere.
But here the similarity between fair price provisions and poison pills
ends. Poison pills, unlike fair price provisions, do not require shareholder
approval to be implemented by a board of directors. 22 Further, once a
poison pill is implemented, a board can neutralize the pill at its discretion
by repurchasing the warrants underlying the pill.23 Consequently, a board
of directors has great control over the success or failure of a tender offer
and the raider is forced to negotiate exclusively with the target corpora-
tion's board. Clearly, the pill's strength and major advantage over fair
price provisions lies in its flexibility and speed of implementation, which
is an important asset in a volatile business environment.
But even if the poison pill is flexible and quickly implemented, it may
not be used haphazardly. Delaware law imposes certain duties on directors
when they decide to implement a defense. These duties are imposed by
the business judgment rule. But exactly what duties are imposed by this
rule and how do these duties apply in the context of implementing a poison
pill or other defense? The following discussion of the business judgment
rule is directed towards answering these questions and providing a basis
for understanding the guidelines of prudent business judgment discussed
later.
B. Fiduciary Duties and The Business Judgment Rule
A great deal has been written about the business judgment rule. The
rule governs much of the area of corporate law and specifically corporate
takeovers. It is well settled that the day-to-day affairs of a corporation
are governed by its board of directors rather than by its shareholders.
24
(1974); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Targets Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 113-14 (1979).
See also Note, Protecting Shareholders, supra note 11, at 1966 (by offering inflated price for
shares until offeror obtains holding of 51% of stock, the two-step merger process holds out
a carrot and then wields a stick).
22. See infra note 77. In Delaware, unless the corporate charter provides otherwise, if a
shareholder or director has votes sufficient to effectuate an action at a meeting of stockholders,
he may do so without a meeting, notice, or vote. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (1974 & Supp.
1982). In lieu of a meeting, obtaining proxies necessary to effectuate an action will suffice. Id.
23. See supra note 17. Many corporations statutes authorize the board to approve certain
mergers without a shareholder vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983); WEST'S ANN.
CORP. § 1101 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (day-
to-day affairs of a company are to be managed by its officers under the supervision of the
directors, however, shareholders must vote on most extraordinary issues). See also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1974) (amending articles of incorporation); id. § 271 (sale of assets); id. §
275 (dissolution); id. § 251 (some mergers).
19871
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Thus, an imbalance of power is created between the directors and the
shareholders they serve.25 To counteract this imbalance, courts have deemed
it necessary to impose a fiduciary duty on directors to exercise good faith
and prudent business judgment in the management of corporate affairs. 26
The business judgment rule creates a presumption in favor of directors
that they have satisfied their fiduciary obligations of acting prudently,
honestly, and in good faith when carrying on the corporation's affairs.2 7
Absent a showing that directors have not lived up to these obligations, a
court may not second guess directors by deciding whether they have made
a correct or incorrect business decision.2"
The business judgment rule has been promulgated not only to restore
the balance of power between directors and shareholders, but also to
promote judicial economy, for without it, the courts would become em-
broiled in corporate affairs. 29 The rule also was promulgated to afford
directors the opportunity to run corporate affairs without fear of constant
shareholder harassment or personal liability for honest mistakes in judg-
ment.30
25. Shareholders, however, have power even though they do not play a role in the
corporation's day-to-day affairs. Shareholders who disagree with decisions of the board have
two means of recourse: they may set the corporate democratic process in motion and begin a
proxy contest to oust the incumbent board or reject the proposed transaction, or they may
bring suit invoking the business judgment rule in order to prevent the transaction or to recover
damages. Generally, the second alternative is chosen because of insufficient time, procedural
obstacles and extraordinary legal costs. See Graham and Pinto, The Business Judgment Rule
and Takeovers, BAMSTER, Spr. 1985, at 36.
26. See, e.g., Conoco, Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (best
judgment must be exercised by directors with respect to any proposal pertaining to corporate
affairs); Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 121, 132 A. 442, 446 (1926)
(directors stand in position of fiduciaries), aff'd, 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 A. 264 (1927); Litwin
v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (directors must exercise duties in honesty and in
good faith). See also Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 321 (1977) (discussion
of director's fiduciary duties to shareholders); Lipton, supra note 21, at 105 (directors owe
shareholders fiduciary duty to act prudently and in good faith on reasonable basis of assurances
that operations are for the benefit of the corporation).
27. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (presumption that directors
act in good and in best interest of the company in making business decisions); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) (directors
presumed to have acted in good faith). Some commentators are against the strict application
of the business judgment rule in the takeover setting. For an excellent analysis of the rule from
this standpoint, see Comment, Proposal for Reform, supra note 17, at 390-92.
28. See generally Block & Prussian, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative
Actions: Viva Zapata, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 32 (1981) (rule enables directors to formulate policy
without judicial second guessing). See also Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp.
892 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 717 F.2d 757, 789 (2d Cir. 1983) (court cannot substitute its
judgment for directors' judgments), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) (courts not competent
to make business decisions).
29. See supra note 28.
30. See, e.g., Mathes v. Cheff, 190 A.2d 524 (Del. Ch. 1963), rev'd, 199 A.2d 543, 555
[Vol. 36:413
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The presumption of prudent business judgment in favor of directors
remains until it can be satisfactorily shown by a challenger" that the
directors have breached their fiduciary duty. The challenger meets this
burden by showing either abuses of discretion that are in violation of the
directors' duty of care,3 2 or actions of self-dealing that are in violation of
the directors' duty of loyalty.33 Duty of loyalty and duty of care are two
components of the directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders. Once a chal-
lenger meets his burden of proof, directors are no longer entitled to the
presumption of propriety. The burden of proof then shifts to the directors
to demonstrate that their actions were taken in the best interest of share-
holders.3 4 Only if the directors' demonstration is satisfactory will they and
the corporation win their case.
Delaware law, as it pertains to corporate defensive strategies," how-
ever, does not automatically afford directors the presumption of pru-
dent business judgment. Rather, the initial burden of proof is placed
on the directors who must make some preliminary showings in order to
win protection of the rule.36 The burden requires proof of reasonable
(Del. 1964); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829) (shareholders cannot expect
infallible directors).
31. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff
must show directors' bad faith, self-interest, or some other impermissible motive); Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (burden on plaintiff to prove breach of fiduciary
duty resulted in loss); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d
at 926 (burden on plaintiff to show fraud or bad faith).
32. For a discussion of a director's duty of care, see infra notes 37-55.
33. Self-interest is a desire of the target's directors to benefit by the takeover through
continued employment, salaries, benefits, power, and control. Courts, however, are generally
unwilling to conclude that this type of self-dealing, by itself, is a per se breach of loyalty. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981)
(noting that a director has a certain amount of self-interest in all business decisions). Different
courts apply varying standards, however, to determine when a plaintiff has proven breach of
loyalty. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp, 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(plaintiff must show fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching, or abuse of discretion), aff'd, 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d at
293 (plaintiff must prove that motive to retain control was primary or sole purpose); Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (plaintiff must show director's gross negligence).
34. A shift in the burden of proof offers little resistance to the target board who usually
offers proof that the offering price was too low, the timing of the takeover was injurious, or
that a change in control would constitute a clear threat to the future business or existing,
successful business policy of the corporation. See Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp.
294, 298 (D. Del. 1981). See infra note 132.
35. However, the business judgment rule as applied to other corporate dealings remains
unchanged. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text and infra notes 36-40 and accom-
panying text.
36. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (initial
burden on directors). The rationale behind placing the initial burden on the directors is that
conflicts of interest necessarily arise when a threat to their control arises. Bennett v. Propp,
19871
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grounds3" for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed. Inclusive in this burden is a showing of good faith and reasonable
investigation.38 Additionally, directors must show that the defensive
mechanism was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.3 9 Finally, they
must show that their decision to implement a defensive strategy was an in-
formed one."' The Delaware Supreme Court clarified the meaning of an in-
formed decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom." This case is integral to
understanding the Household decision and provides a basis for recommen-
dations made later in this Note.
In Van Gorkom, three former shareholders of Trans Union Corporation
(TU) sought damages as a result of TU's merger with a subsidiary of the
Marmon Group Corporation.4 The court's decision focused primarily on
the activities of TU's directors during the six days in between the TU
chairman's initial approach to the Marmon Group's chairman and the
approval of the merger by TU's board.43 The Delaware Supreme Court
held that TU's board was not entitled to the presumption of prudent
business judgment because TU's chairman was grossly negligent in his
actions preceding the board's approval of the merger, and TU's board
failed to adequately inform itself prior to its approval of the merger."4
According to the record, Marmon's chairman made an offer to TU's
chairman to purchase TU at a price previously discussed at a social outing.
At this time, no other TU director had any knowledge of the offer. 45 Two
days later TU's chairman, without notice, called a special meeting of the
board in order to consider the proposal. 46 The bulk of the meeting consisted
of a twenty minute oral presentation made by TU's chairman outlining
the terms of the offer and a brief presentation made by legal counsel
indicating that failure to accept the offer might be a breach of the directors'
fiduciary duty because shareholders would be denied a fifty percent pre-
mium over the per share market price of TU's stock.4 7 During the meeting,
TU's financial officer briefly explained that according to his valuation
187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. Super. Ct. 1962); Delaware Rulings Complicate Poison Pill Picture,
Legal Times, Feb. 4, 1985, at 9, col. 1.
37. Proof of reasonableness is materially enhanced where the majority of the board favoring
the defensive mechanism are outside directors who have complied with the good faith and
reasonable investigation standards. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812-15.
38. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 507, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (1964).
39. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
40. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (McNeilly, J. and Christie, J.,
dissenting).
41. Id. at 873.
42. Id. at 858.
43. Id. at 864-70.
44. Id. at 864.
45. Id. at 865-67.
46. Id. at 867.
47. Id. at 868.
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study, which the court found to be cursory and inaccurate, the price
offered for TU's shares was within the range indicated by his study .4 The
meeting closed with approval of the offer by TU's board. No director
asked to review the draft agreement of the offer and no director consulted
with an investment banker or other personnel qualified to assess the offer's
fairness to shareholders 4 9
In holding that TU's board was not entitled to the presumption of
prudent business judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that
the board's burden of proof would only be met if it had informed itself
"prior to making a business decision, of all material information reason-
ably available to [it]."5O The court concluded that an informed decision
had not been made. The court further stated that TU's directors were
grossly negligent,5 because they made an "unintelligent or unadvised
judgment" when they blindly accepted their chairman's recommendations
to accept Marmon's tender offer . 2 The court specifically noted the direc-
tors' failure to read the draft agreement, their overall cursory review of
the offer, and their acceptance of the offer without adequate consideration
of the true value of TU or the effects of the offer on shareholders. 3 In
making these findings, the court pointed out that TU's board did not
consult with an investment banker and that no reliable valuation study
had been conducted.54 The court also found theboard negligent because
it failed to recess to consider the offer in depth, even though there was
no crisis requiring action in a short period of time.5 Thus, the Van
Gorkom decision stands for the proposition that, in Delaware, no pre-
sumption of propriety exists for directors who make uninformed takeover
decisions in a grossly negligent manner. 6
II. TmE HOUSEHOLD DECISION
A. Facts and Prior Procedure
Moran v. Household International, Inc. came to the Delaware Supreme
Court from the Delaware Chancery Court which upheld the Household
48. Id. at 866, 875. The valuation study was not a true valuation study, but rather, a study
concerning a leveraged buy-out of TU by the Marmon Group. Id. at 866. The study calculated
the book value of TU based on a fictional value of $55 per share decided on by TU's chairman
according to the company's historic stock market price. Id.
49. Id. at 877.
50. Id. at 872 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
51. 488 A.2d at 872.
52. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933)).
53. 488 A.2d at 874.
54. Id. at 877-78.
55. Id. at 877.
56. Id. at 881.
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board's adoption of a poison pill plan as a legitimate exercise of business
judgment.5 7 Household was a holding company with its principle subsi-
diaries in the financial services, transportation, and merchandising indus-
tries.58 Its board was composed of sixteen directors, ten outside directors
and six members of management.5 9 Appellant Moran, one of Household's
outside directors and chairman of the Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corporation,
the largest single stockholder of Household stock, began discussions with
Household's board about a possible leveraged buy-out 60 after observing
that Household's stock was significantly undervalued in the market in
relation to its book value. 61 The record showed that Moran never intended
a hostile takeover and further, that Moran's suggestion of a buy-out never
progressed beyond mere discussion. 62
Prior to its discussions with Moran, the Household board retained legal
counsel to develop an anti-takeover strategy. 63 Several plans, including a
fair price provision, 64 were considered by the board but were rejected in
favor of the poison pill which was adopted without shareholder approval 65
on August 14, 1984.66 The record showed that the poison pill was not
implemented in response to Moran's overtures or any other impending
battle with a corporate raider, but rather, as a precautionary measure to
ward off future advances in the uneasy and volatile takeover environment
surrounding the financial services industry at the time. 67
Household's poison pill plan provided that common shareholders would
be issued one warrant per common share on the occurrence of one of two
57. 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
58. 500 A.2d at 1349.
59. Id. at 1348 n.2.
60. Id. at 1349.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. In addition, the chancery court's record shows that Household employed an
investment banker who worked side-by-side with legal counsel in developing the "Raid Pre-
paredness" plan. The plan assessed the overall takeover climate as well as various other anti-
takeover devices. 490 A.2d at 1065.
64, 490 A.2d at 1065. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
65. 490 A.2d at 1065. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
66. 490 A.2d at 1065. The poison pill plan was approved after nearly two hours of discussion
by a vote of fourteen to two with only Moran and one other director dissenting. Id. at 1067.
In opposition to the board, Moran argued that the poison pill plan would deny shareholders
the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium on occurrence of a tender offer. Id. See infra
notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
67. 490 A.2d at 1065. Household was concerned about the frequency of "bust-up" and
"bootstrap" takeovers in the form of two-tier tender offers in the financial services industry
as early as February 1984, well before Moran's discussions with Household concerning a
leveraged buy-out. Id. See supra notes 3, 20-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of
"bust-up" takeovers and two-tier tender offers. The board was specifically concerned with the
possible adverse affects that an attempted takeover would have on employee performance and
morale. 490 A.2d at 1065.
[Vol. 36:413
HOUSEHOLD
specified events. The first was an announcement of a tender offer for at
least thirty percent of Household's shares. The second was the acquisition
of at least twenty percent of Household's shares by any single entity or
group.68 In the case of a tender offer for thirty percent of Household's
shares, the issued warrants would immediately entitle the warrant holders
to purchase one-hundredth of a share of Household's new and specially
issued preferred stock69 for $100.70 The board, without shareholder ap-
proval, could redeem these warrants at fifty cents per warrant. 71 If any
party acquired twenty percent or more of Household's shares, the issued
warrants would again be exercisable to purchase one-hundredth of a share
of new preferred stock for $100,72 but the warrants would automatically
become nonredeemable by the board. 73 Most importantly, if a warrant
had not previously been exercised and a raider forced a merger or con-
solidation, each warrant would be exercisable to purchase $200 of the
common stock of the continuing corporation for $100. 74
B. Moran's Arguments and the Court's Response
The Delaware Supreme Court wholeheartedly affirmed the Delaware
Chancery Court's decision. It held that Household's directors were au-
thorized to adopt the poison pill, that the poison pill did not usurp rights
of shareholders to receive hostile tender offers by changing Household's
fundamental structure, the pill did not seriously restrict shareholders'
rights to conduct a proxy contest, and that implementation of the poison
pill was a legitimate exercise of business judgment. 75 In so holding, the
Delaware Supreme Court struck down numerous theories presented by
Moran attacking the validity of the poison pill.
Moran first contended that the board was unauthorized to adopt
the poison pill because no provision of the Delaware Corporation
68. 500 A.2d at 1348.
69. The new preferred stock would be nonredeemable and subordinate to other series of
Household's preferred stock. Its dividend right would be 100 times that of Household's common
stock, and its liquidation preference would be the same as the common stock's. 490 A.2d at
1066.
70. 500 A.2d at 1349. No prudent investor would exercise his warrants at this price. See
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
71. 500 A.2d at 1349. Because the warrants were still redeemable at this stage, Household's
board could nullify the effects of the pill if a favorable takeover opportunity had arisen. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
72. 500 A.2d at 1349.
73. Id. If both triggering events occurred consecutively, as in a tender offer for thirty
percent of Household's shares and then an actual acquisition of twenty percent of Household's
shares, the warrants issued on occurrence of the thirty percent trigger would become nonre-
deemable as soon as twenty percent of Household's stock was acquired.
74. Id. This is the so-called "flip over" provision. See supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
75. 500 A.2d at 1357.
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Code authorized such a plan.7 ' The court dispelled this theory, explain-
ing that section 157"' of the Code authorized the poison pill warrant"
and that section 1511" authorized the issuance of the new preferred
76. Id. at 1351.
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1974). The power to issue warrants to purchase shares
is conferred by section 157 which provides in pertinent part:
Subject to any provisions in the certificate of incorporation, every corporation
may create and issue, whether or not in connection with the issue and sale of any
shares of stock or other securities of the corporation, rights or options entitling the
holders thereof to purchase from the corporation any share of its capital stock of
any class or classes, such rights or options to be evidenced by or in such instrument
or instruments as shall be approved by the board of directors.
78. In one of his arguments, Moran contended that section 157 could not authorize the
poison pill because the section would become contradictory to section 203(a), a notice statute.
500 A.2d at 1352-53. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a). Section 203 provides lax standards
generally requiring that notice be given to a target corporation before a tender offer is made
for its shares. The fact that section 203 creates little burden to the offeror, Moran argued,
evidences legislative intent to reject any interpretation of the Delaware Corporation Code that
would impede the tender offer process. 500 A.2d at 1353.
The court rejected this contention as a non sequitur, holding that the legislature's desire to
impose minimal state regulations on tender offers does not indicate its desire to preclude private
regulation of this activity through the use of anti-takeover devices. Id. See supra note 77.
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (1974) which provides:
No offeror shall make a tender offer unless:
(1) Not less than 20 nor more than 60 days before the date the tender offer is
to be made, the offeror shall deliver personally or by registered or certified mail to
the corporation whose equity securities are to be subject to the tender offer, at its
registered office in this State or at its principal place of business, a written statement
of the offeror's intention to make the tender offer . ...
(2) The tender offer shall remain open for a period of at least 20 days after it is
first made to the holders of the equity securities, during which period any stockholder
may withdraw any of the equity securities tendered to the offeror, and any revised
or amended tender offer which changes the amount or type of consideration offered
or the number of equity securities for which the offer is made shall remain open
at least 10 days following the amendment; and
(3) The offeror and any associate of the offeror will not purchase or pay for any
tendered equity security for a period of at least 20 days after the tender offer is
first made to the holders of the equity securities, and no such purchase or payment
shall be made within 10 days after an amended or revised tender offer if the
amendment or revision changes the amount or type of consideration offered or the
number of equity securities for which the offer is made. If during the period the
tender offer must remain open pursuant to this section a greater number of equity
securities is tendered than the offeror is bound or willing to purchase, the equity
securities shall be purchased pro rata, as nearly as may be, according to the number
of shares tendered during such period by each equity security holder.
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (1974 Supp. 1982). Section 151(g) provides:
When any corporation desires to issue any shares of stock of any class or of
any series of any class of which the voting powers, designations, preferences and
relative, participating optional or other rights, if any, or the qualifications, limi-
tations or restrictions thereof, if any, shall not have been set forth in the certificate
of incorporation or in any amendment thereto but shall be provided for in a
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stock"° underlying the warrants.' The fact that these sections previously had
not been applied in the context of a takeover defense was of no consequence
to the court which held that the sections' application would not be limited
to its prior common use, corporate financing, without a clear showing of
legislative intent to that effect.82
resolution or resolutions adopted by the board of directors pursuant to authority
expressly vested in it by the provisions of the certificate of incorporation or any
amendment thereto, a certificate setting forth a copy of such resolution or resolutions
and the number of shares of stock of such class or series shall be executed,
acknowledged, filed, recorded, and shall become effective, in accordance with §
103 of this title.
80. See supra note 69.
81. 500 A.2d at 1351.
82. Id. The court noted that Delaware corporate law is not static but rather responds to
evolving concepts and needs. The fact that the Delaware Corporation Code is silent as to a
specific matter does not mean it is prohibited. Id. (citing Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985)).
The court rejected another argument made by Moran on this basis. Moran contended that
section 157 authorizes the issuance of warrants "entitling holders to purchase from the cor-
poration any shares of its capital stock .... ." 500 A.2d at 1352. See supra note 79. Thus,
Moran contended that the statute's plain language indicated that a corporation could not issue
warrants to purchase another corporation's stock. 500 A.2d at 1352. The court rejected this
argument with an analogy to anti-dilution provisions found in many corporation securities.
These provisions protect shareholders in the event of a merger by giving them the right to
convert their securities into whatever securities are to replace the stock of their company. Id.
Corporations use these provisions for financing purposes because of shareholders' fears that
their securities would become worthless in the event of a merger. These provisions give poten-
tial shareholders confidence, and in return, they purchase the corporation's securities.
The similarity between anti-dilution provisions and the poison pill is that they both allow
the shareholder to acquire the new corporation's stock upon merger. Thus, the Household
court held that without a clear showing of legislative intent to the contrary, there was no basis
for declaring the poison pill invalid when anti-dilution provisions have been upheld. 500 A.2d
at 1352. The court also held, contrary to Moran's argument, that the warrants underlying the
poison pill were not a "sham" and that the new preferred stock issued to cover the warrants
was not illusory. Id. The court noted that the warrants could be exercised upon their issuance
and that they most assuredly would be exercised following a hostile merger or consolidation.
Id. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Thus, the warrants were not a "sham." 500
A.2d at 1352. As to the preferred stock, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Chancery
Court's finding that its superior dividend and liquidation rights prevented it from being
considered illusory. Id. See supra note 69.
Alternatively, Moran questioned the authorization of the poison pill pursuant to section 157
on constitutional grounds, asserting that the poison pill was violative of the commerce and the
supremacy clauses since it is an. obstacle to the policies underlying the Williams Act. 500 A.2d
at 1353. The court rejected the assertion, holding that Household's actions as a private party
in implementing the pill pursuant to state statute did not provide sufficient nexus to the state
for there to be a state action which may violate the commerce or the supremacy clauses. Id.
Accordingly, the Williams Act, Pub L. No. 90-439, Stat. 454 (1968) (amending Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 894 (1934)), which prohibits manipulative acts or
practices in connection with tender offers, works only to prohibit state actions that are
manipulative and not those of private parties. 500 A.2d. at 1353. Drawing the above conclusions,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that Household's board had the authority to implement the
poison pill. Id.
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Moran's second major contention was that the board's approval of the
poison pill usurped shareholders' rights to receive hostile tender offers8"
by altering Household's fundamental structure.8 4 The structural change,
Moran argued, resulted from the board's unfettered discretion" to refuse
to redeem the warrants even when a takeover would be economically
favorable to Household's shareholders.86 This fundamental transfer of
power from the shareholders to the board would give the board exclusive
control over the success or failure of a tender offer,8 7 thereby depriving
shareholders of their right to decide the ultimate fate of the corporation.88
The court refuted these assertions and held that the poison pill affected
no more structural change than other previously upheld anti-takeover
devices89 and that, even if some change did result, shareholders did not
seriously lose their ability to receive hostile tender offers. 90 Specifically,
the court noted that the pill alters a corporation's structure less than the
"crown jewel" 91 defense which destroys the assets of a corporation, or
the "greenmail ' 92 defense which causes an outflow of corporate funds
and thus impedes a corporation's financial flexibility. 93 Further, hostile
tender offers could be accomplished in many ways, in spite of the pill. 94
Possibilities include: tendering with a condition that the board redeem the
warrants; tendering and soliciting proxies to remove the board and then
redeeming the warrants; acquiring 50%b of the shares and causing Household
to self-tender for the warrants; tendering with a high minimum condition
of shares and warrants; and finally, acquiring up to 19.9% of Household's
shares and soliciting proxies to remove the board and then redeeming the
warrants."
The court also held, contrary to Moran's argument, that the board does
not have unfettered discretion 96 in denying all tender offers.97 Rather, the
directors' fiduciary duty98 to shareholders mandates that they consider
each bid carefully on its own merits and specifically consider whether the
83. 500 A.2d at 1353-54.
84. Id.




89. See supra notes 4 & 9.
90. 500 A.2d at 1354.
91. See supra note 8.
92. 500 A.2d at 1354. See supra note 8. Also, as the court noted, the poison pill did not
dilute earnings per share and did not adversely affect the market price of Household's stock.





98. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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offer would be in the best economic interest of the shareholders.9 9 If
shareholders' interests would be better served by accepting a hostile take-
over bid, the board must deactivate the pill by repurchasing the warrants
and allow the takeover to run its course. °00 The above considerations, the
court concluded, would not warrant a finding that the poison pill was
invalid on the theory that it precluded shareholders from accepting hostile
tender offers.' 0'
Moran's third contention, that the poison pill would restrict sharehold-
ers' rights to conduct a proxy contest, 0 2 was also struck down by the
court. 0 3 The court noted that while the pill does restrict individual share-
holders or groups of shareholders from first acquiring beneficial ownership"
°4
of twenty percent of Household's shares before waging a proxy contest,
this restriction would have minimal effect on the success of a proxy
contest. 0 15 Evidence presented at trial showed that many proxy contests
were won with insurgent ownership of less than twenty percent of a
corporation's outstanding shares and that very large holdings did not
guarantee the success of a takeover. 10 6 Thus, in the court's view, the key
variable in a successful proxy contest was the merit of the insurgent
shareholders' issues and not how much stock the raider had acquired.
Accordingly, the Household court held that the poison pill defense is legal
in Delaware. 0 7 The court, however, still needed to pronounce a standard
to determine when and under what circumstances a board could legally
use the poison pill. The court concluded that the business judgment rule
was the appropriate doctrine for determining whether a board of directors
had lawfully implemented a poison pill. °s Moreover, the Household court
held that the business judgment rule was applicable in determining the
lawfulness of preemptive defenses generally. 0 9 In so holding, the court
noted that preemptive defenses required pre-planning which would reduce
the risk that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, directors would fail
99. 500 A.2d at 1354.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1355. Moran argued that once the warrants become unredeemable by the board,
insurgent shareholders, even if they won a proxy contest, could not effectuate the merger they
desired because the price of acquiring Household would remain cost prohibitive for the ten
year life of the warrants. 500 A.2d at 1355 n.12.
103. Id. at 1355.
104. The court's interpretation of Household's poison pill led it to believe that an individual
insurgent or group of insurgents must own an outright twenty percent of Household's shares.
Id. A holding of twenty percent of the total proxies, the court concluded, would not cause the




108. Id. at 1350.
109. Id.
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to exercise prudent business judgment. 10 Thus, in the court's view, ap-
plication of the business judgment rule to pre-planned defensive strategy
was especially appropriate." 1
After upholding the applicability of the business judgment rule to the
poison pill defense, the Household court held that Household's directors
were entitled to the presumption of prudent business judgment.1" The
court found that the board had met its burden of proof by showing that
it had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
or effectiveness existed. 113 The court further found that the board exercised
good faith and reasonable investigation,"14 that use of the poison pill was
reasonable in relation to the threat posed, and that the board was not
grossly negligent in reaching an informed opinion with respect to the pill's
effect on shareholders' interests. 115
The court noted that the board's implementation of the poison pill was
in response to a perceived threat of "bust-up" takeovers in the form of
coercive two-tier tender offers and the negative effect a two-tier' tender
offer would have on employee morale and productivity. 1 6 Furthermore,
the court found that the decision to implement the poison pill was a
reasonable response to the threat of coercive two-tier tender offers because
the decision was made by a majority of the board who were outside
directors and not seriously prone to conflicts of interest." 7 Finally, the
board's decision was presumed to have been made in good faith because
Moran never alleged self-dealing on the part of Household's directors." 8
The Household court then found that an informed decision had been
made by the board because board members had conducted extended dis-
cussions amongst themselves and with legal counsel before implementing
the poison pill defense." 9 The court noted that each director received a
notebook which contained an outline of the poison pill plan and copies
of articles concerning the current takeover environment. 120 Moreover, the
court decided that the board was well informed and reasonable in its
conclusion that the poison pill did not restrict proxy contests and did not
preclude shareholders from receiving hostile tender offers.,2 In sum, the
court held that the Household directors' implementation of the poison pill
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 1357.
113. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
115. 500 A.2d at 1356-57.
116. Id. at 1357.
117. See supra note 37.






was not a grossly negligent, uninformed decision and that they were
entitled to protection afforded by the business judgment rule.' 22
III. ANALYSIS
Delaware courts have long upheld defensive strategies under the business
judgment rule. 23 However, Household was the first Delaware Supreme
Court decision to uphold a preemptive defense under such a doctrine. The
court noted the major distinction between Household and prior decisions
stating: "[H]ere we have a defensive mechanism adopted to ward-off
possible future advances and not [as in prior cases] in reaction to a specific
threat."' 124 The decision, therefore, encourages preemptive defenses by
sanctioning their use under the business judgment rule. It is debatable,
however, whether takeovers are desirable in terms of public policy.
Some commentators view takeovers, hostile or otherwise, as favorable
because they benefit target shareholders and the economy by maximizing
share prices and increasing economic efficiency.' 25 Under this view,
preemptive defenses are undesirable because they hinder the movement of
assets to more efficient management and deny shareholders the opportunity
to secure the maximum price for their shares as dictated by the economic
forces of supply and demand.' 26 Some proponents of this position go so
far as to say that target management should never be allowed to defend
itself from hostile tender offers.'27 According to this view, preemptive
defenses are disruptive because of their potential to severely curtail take-
over activity.
Opponents of this view question whether takeover activity has a positive
impact on the economy' 2 because many target corporations are already
profitable and productive and their demise, therefore, would not benefit
the economy. Furthermore, opponents are not ready to concede that
takeovers have significantly affected the economy on the whole. At the
most, takeovers cause only regional economic instability because the tar-
122. Id. at 1356-57.
123. Id. at 1350.
124. Id.
125. Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare,
36 Bus. LAW. 1733, 1734-39 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids].
126. Id. at 1739; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1194 (1981).
127. Lipton, Takeover Bids in The Targets Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easter-
brook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1232-33 (1980).
128. Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 125, at 1746 (tender offers do not
involve management decisions). See Opposition to "Poison Pill" Warrants is Mounting, LEGAL
TimEs, Oct. 15, 1984, at 13. See also Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 844-45 (1981) (poison pills
unfair to shareholders); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985) (poison
pill deprives shareholder's right to tender offer).
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get's employees may be fired or the corporation's assets may be sold by
the raider subsequent to the takeover. According to this view, preemptive
defenses are welcomed as a viable means to control regional economic
stability and protect productive and profitable corporations. How each
individual stands on these economic issues largely determines his view of
the desirability of preemptive defenses. However, another important de-
terminant is one's view on the role of directors and shareholders in the
takeover process.
Some commentators believe directors should play little or no role in the
takeover process for two reasons. First, hostile tender offers are made to
shareholders, not directors, and shareholders can certainly determine
whether or not it is in their own best interest to accept or reject the price
offered for their shares. 2 9 Second, directors face an inherent conflict of
interest in a takeover situation and may implement a defense contrary to
the best interests of the shareholders in order to protect the incumbent
regime. 30 Those who agree with these views probably also believe preemp-
tive defenses unfavorably increase the director's role in takeover situations.
However, others believe that directors should assume an active role in
the takeover process because they are in a superior position to render
takeover decisions given their knowledge and expertise. Indeed, the busi-
ness judgment rule is premised on the notion that directors are best suited
to run corporate affairs and should be allowed to do so without fear of
shareholder harassment. Proponents of this view also argue that share-
holders cannot make takeover decisions in their own best interest when
confronted with a coercive takeover bid, such as a two-tier tender offer,
because they may accept the offer out of fear that they will receive little
or nothing for their shares subsequent to a forced merger. Thus, share-
holders individually may accept an offer they would reject collectively.',
Advocates of this position welcome preemptive defenses as a tool to be
used by directors in order to protect shareholders' interests.
As a practical matter, it is too early to determine whether preemptive
defenses will have a significant effect in protecting individual corporations
or reducing takeover activity over all. Two factors will lessen the effec-
tiveness of preemptive defenses. First, raiders still have options available
to force a merger in spite of a preemptive defense. The Household court
even outlined a raider's options in respect to the poison pill. Second, at
the time of attack, the raider may bring suit to force a target's board to
stop its defense if the raider can prove that the tender offer is in the best
interest of shareholders and that the directors are breaching their fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by preventing the takeover. As evidenced in the
129. Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 125, at 1745.
130. Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 267 (1983).
131. See supra note 21.
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Household decision, this recourse may not always be fruitful, because
directors can plan their defenses to meet the requirements of the business
judgment rule.
IV. IMPACT
The business judgment rule requires that directors meet the traditional
requirements of good faith and prudent judgment. However, the court's
posture in applying these standards appears lenient. Directors, with proper
planning, can meet these burdens with relative ease. Indeed, the Household
court summarized the current requirements of the business judgment rule,
presenting practical guidelines for directors to use when implementing
defensive strategies that will win the rule's protection. Thus, the Household
decision is analogous to an apothecary because it dispenses the medicine
needed by directors to meet their burden of proof under the business
judgment rule. Moreover, the Household decision contains antidotes to
the poison pill that allow prospective raiders to work around the poison
pill's prohibitive effect on a takeover bid.
A. The Apothecary
Directors who desire to implement the poison pill, as well as other
preemptive defenses, must insure that they can meet the burden of proof
imposed by the business judgment rule. If this burden is met, it secures
for directors the presumption of prudent business judgment in their de-
cision to implement their chosen defense. Once the presumption is estab-
lished, it is hard to overcome because a challenger must then prove that
the directors have breached their fiduciary duty.3 2 Chances are excellent,
therefore, that the poison pill plan will be upheld once directors meet
their initial burden of proof. Meeting the burden, however, requires careful
planning on the directors' part so that sufficient evidence indicating pru-
dent behavior can be presented at trial.
First, directors should start planning their anti-takeover strategy as early
as possible.' 33 In Household, for example, the court specifically noted that
Household's directors considered implementing the poison pill far in ad-
132. Contrary to the challenger's burden, the directors' burden is easily met. A number of
business reasons can be proffered by directors to explain why a takeover is undesirable. For
example, directors may consider the offering price inadequate or the selling time inappropriate.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). See Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017, 1022-23
(1981). See also Comment, Proposal for Reform, supra note 17, at 386; E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CoRPoRATo LAW 75-81 (1972).
133. Cf. Household, 500 A.2d at 1350 ("pre-planning for the contingency of a hostile takeover
might reduce the risk that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, management will fail to exer-
cise reasonable judgment"); Delaware Rulings Complicate Poison Pill Picture, Legal Times,
Feb. 4, 1985, at 9, col. 1.
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vance of any specific threat or actual takeover bid. 34 When directors begin
their planning process early, they allow themselves adequate time to make
a reasonable investigation and an informed decision. Moreover, early
planning evidences good faith on the directors' part and precludes a finding
of self-interest because directors will not be forced to make rushed deci-
sions under pressure of an imminent takeover bid. 3 '
Second, directors should schedule multiple board meetings to discuss
the poison pill defense and its effects on shareholders. 36 Multiple discus-
sions evidence reasonable investigation into the matter and reflect an
absence of self-dealing. In the event that directors have not sufficiently
planned ahead and a takeover threat becomes imminent, the directors
should, at a minimum, adjourn their emergency meeting for several hours
to review relevant documents and economic materials and to consult with
legal counsel and qualified financial personnel.'37 The adjournment will
evidence some semblance of an informed decision.
Third, detailed minutes of all board meetings pertaining to anti-takeover
strategy should be kept. The minutes serve an important evidentiary
function because they show that the directors adequately discussed anti-
takeover plans and sought opinions from outside individuals such as
attorneys and investment bankers. 3 ' Thus, directors will avoid allegations
of self-dealing or making uninformed decisions. Additionally, the minutes
should reflect that the directors had reasonable grounds for believing that
a hostile takeover attempt would endanger existing corporate policy and
effectiveness. This may be accomplished by a board discussion concerning
the effect of a hostile bid on employee morale and productivity.' 39
The gathering and distribution of data, concerning the current takeover
climate, to the directors is further proof of reasonable grounds. This proof
will be enhanced if the data reflects a relatively high frequency of coercive
takeover bids such as two-tier tender offers.'40 In Household, for example,
the court concluded that the directors had reasonable grounds for believing
that a hostile takeover attempt would endanger the corporation, largely
because the corporation was supplied with such data.' 4'
134. 500 A.2d at 1350.
135. Id.
136. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
137. Cf. 500 A.2d at 1350 (pre-planning reduces the risks).
138. See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 813-14, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807,
811 (1976) (board decision upheld where minutes showed directors considered various proposed
plans); Chef v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (minutes served important
function in determining self-dealing); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962) (minutes may
be supplemented with oral testimony).





Under Delaware law, proof of reasonableness is enhanced if a majority
of directors favoring the poison pill are outside directors. 4 2 The minutes
should show, therefore, that the decision process was structured in such
a way that outside directors made the final determination on the merit of
all proposals relating to a poison pill's implementation.
Fourth, whenever an anti-takeover strategy is contemplated, it is essen-
tial to consult with investment bankers or other qualified financial per-
sonnel as to the economic effects of an acquisition on shareholders.13 A
detailed valuation study should be conducted and should contain all of
the important economic attributes of the corporation, including the cor-
poration's book value. Delaware courts consider the existence and use of
valuation studies extremely important in determining whether directors
have acted in good faith and have reached an informed decision.144 The
valuation study should be conducted by an outside investment banking
firm because its work will be beyond reproach in terms of self-dealing or
self-interest. Qualified in-house financial staff may also conduct the study
but should be aware that their work will be carefully scrutinized by the
courts as to its accuracy and validity. The study should indicate whether
a takeover would be favorable to shareholders, and if so, at what price
per share. 45 If a takeover would not presently benefit shareholders, the
study should indicate whether another time would be more suitable.' 46
Fifth, legal counsel specializing in mergers and acquisitions should work
side-by-side with an investment banker to develop a poison pill plan that
fits the economic needs of the defending corporation. Additionally, both
legal counsel and the investment banker, or other qualified personnel,
should be present during board discussions of the poison pill plan to make
suggestions and answer questions about the pill's economic effect on
shareholders and the pill's legality . 47 Legal counsel should inform the
board that while an opinion conducted by an investment banker is not
required in Delaware as a matter of law, 48 the opinion would serve a
useful purpose in litigation. These suggestions help to insure that an
142. 493 A.2d at 955. For a discussion of whether courts place too much weight on the role
of independent directors, see Werner, Corporation Law in Search of its Future, 81 COLuM. L.
REv. 1611, 1656-58 (1981) (courts' deference to outside directors' judgment impairs shareholders'
protection against management abuses). But see Lipton, supra note 127, at 1235 (majority of
directors not affiliated with management take responsibilities seriously).
143. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877-78. See also Panter, 646 F.2d at 275 (reliance
on investment banking reports); Treadway Cos., 638 F.2d at 356 (reliance on investment
bankers); Buffalo Forge Co., 555 F. Supp. at 904 (reliance on investment bankers).
144. See, e.g., Panter, 646 F.2d at 271 (reliance on attorneys); Buffalo Forge Co., 555 F.
Supp at 904 (reliance on attorneys).
145. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877.
146. Id. at 876-85.
147. Id. at 868.
148. Id.
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informed decision has been made and that directors have acted without
self-interest.
Sixth, although a showing of self-interest alone is not generally enough
to show bad faith, a prudent board should nonetheless seek to reduce the
appearance of self-dealing by relying on the opinions of outside experts,
such as investment bankers and legal counsel, as much as possible.' 4 9
Reliance on experts demonstrates good faith and objectivity and will help
shield directors from charges that they breached their fiduciary duty when
a challenger attempts to rebut the presumption of prudent business judg-
ment.
B. Antidotes
The Household court offered prospective raiders several ways in which
to complete a successful tender offer in spite of the poison pill.so The
court first suggested that a raider could profit, through peaceful means,
by negotiating a friendly takeover with the target. If a target agreed to
be acquired, its board would simply redeem the warrants, thereby enabling
the now friendly raider to make a viable tender offer. The obvious
drawback, however, to this suggestion is that many corporations do not
want to be acquired and will refuse to negotiate.
In this case, the court suggested that a raider could make a tender offer
hoping to acquire fifty percent of the target's shares. The raider could
then replace the target's board with directors who would redeem the
warrants. This strategy, however, coild be costly because a raider may
never acquire enough shares to gain control. A more conservative strategy,
noted by the Household court, is that a raider could make a tender offer
conditional on a controlling number of shares actually being tendered.
Thus, if shareholders refuse to tender, the offer will fail and the raider
will have lost nothing. Shareholders would have incentive to accept a
conditional tender offer because if they decide to hold onto their shares
so as to exercise their warrant upon merger, the tender offer may fail and
they would lose a sure profit.
The court also suggested that a raider could wage a proxy contest in
order to replace the target's board with directors who would redeem the
warrants underlying the poison pill. The court noted that acquisition of
proxies by a raider, without beneficial ownership of the underlying stock,
149. Directors are generally allowed to rely reasonably and in good faith on experts chosen
with due care. See, e.g., Panter, 486 F. Supp. at 1194 (directors entitled to rely on outside
experts); Cheff, 199 A.2d at 556 (directors properly relied on investment bankers' reports
showing raider had a bad reputation in the business community); Kaplan v. Goldsant, 380 A.2d
556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (board properly relied on investment bankers' reports in setting price
for stock repurchase). Further, the Delaware Corporation Code specifically allows reliance on
experts. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1974).
150. 500 A.2d at 1354.
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may not trigger the warrant thereby enabling warrant holders to purchase
stock at a reduced price. However, beneficial ownership of the target's
stock is required before a warrant may be exercised in this fashion. Thus,
a raider could acquire as many proxies as is needed to replace the target's
board, without triggering the warrants.
One antidote not mentioned by the court is that a raider could gain
control of a corporation through either a tender offer or a proxy contest
via a shell corporation, and gradually transfer the target's assets to this
corporation. Because a merger is never effectuated, the warrants will never
become effective and therefore could not be exercised for stock of the
continuing corporation. Thus, by avoiding the formation of a new cor-
poration, the raider will avoid the costly effect of the warrants.
A second antidote, not mentioned by the Household court, is that a
raider can exert pressure on a target's board to redeem the warrants by
making a tender offer conditional on the board's redemption of the
warrants. If a target's directors believe that a raider will eventually be
able to force a merger, they may be willing to accept a favorable price
while they still can. New versions of the poison pill are likely to appear
in the near future because of the pill's effectiveness against popular two-
tier tender offers. These new versions will probably try to draft around
the antidotes presented above, making them obsolete. It is likely, however,
that opportunistic raiders will find new antidotes as fast as protective
corporations find new poison pills. In the interim, the above antidotes
will remain effective against poison pills of the Household variety.
CONCLUSION
The Household court provided guidelines for attorneys and directors to
use when implementing a poison pill takeover defense. The court also
provided antidotes to the poison pill to be used by prospective corporate
raiders. A prudent board of directors will follow the Delaware Supreme
Court's suggestions for exercising good business judgment and, in return,
its implementation of the poison pill defense will be upheld. New versions
of the poison pill are likely to appear in the near future because of the
pill's effectiveness against popular two-tier tender offers. These new ver-
sions are likely to render the antidotes to the poison pill provided by the
Delaware Supreme Court obsolete. Opportunistic raiders, however, are
likely to find new antidotes as fast as protective corporations find new
poison pills.
Ronald David Ellin
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